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Contemporary standing doctrine has revolutionized public inter-
est litigation by requiring not only that the injuries asserted be indi-
viduated, but that the remedies sought be capable of redressing those
harms.  Through standing doctrine, the Court has erected a substan-
tial barrier to citizen oversight of both governmental and non-
governmental conduct.
Although much of standing doctrine protects decision-making by
Congress and the executive branch, the Court ironically has more re-
cently used standing doctrine to enhance its own power at the ex-
pense of Congress.  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,1 the Court in-
validated a congressional grant of citizen standing under the
Endangered Species Act because the congressional enactment failed
to require sufficient injury in fact. Subsequently, in Raines v. Byrd,2
the Court invalidated a congressional grant of standing to members of
Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act.  Although the rhetoric
of Lujan and Raines defends standing in terms of preserving a limited
judicial role, the reality is that courts have interfered with the majori-
tarian process by nullifying congressional decisions as to the appro-
priate parties to vindicate particular rights.  The Court has trans-
muted standing from a means of protecting the majoritarian process
into a judicial weapon that can override congressional judgments
about the optimal enforcement of particular laws.
Lujan contemplates that courts must independently assess each
asserted injury in fact to assure that the injury is substantial or at least
individuated enough to satisfy the “case or controversy” require-
* Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  I would like to thank
Doug Letter and Dan Tarlock for comments on an earlier draft, and I would like to thank the
Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum for taking the initiative to host and facilitate the re-
cent conference on Laidlaw.
1. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
2. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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ment.3  A congressional creation of a new injury may suffice—such as
under the Freedom of Information Act4 or the National Environ-
mental Policy Act5—but only if the injury meets the Court’s criteria
for the injury in fact test.  For instance, a congressional determination
that all citizens are harmed by pollution is not enough.  Congress
must limit standing to a group harmed by pollution in a particular
way, whether because of increased risk of disease or because of fre-
quent use of affected areas.  Courts limit congressional control of ac-
cess to the courthouse doors.
The Court, however, has not had occasion to determine whether
congressional findings or determinations as to redressability—a dis-
tinct doctrinal component of standing6—should similarly be second-
guessed.  In contrast to injury in fact, the redressability inquiry is
more fact based.  Courts must predict the degree to which a favorable
judicial decision will remedy the plaintiff’s asserted injury.  The re-
dressability inquiry also often includes complex forecasting.
This past term’s decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc.7 raises the deference issue.  In Laidlaw
the Court held in a Clean Water Act suit that the plaintiff environ-
mental organization could seek civil penalties payable to the United
States Treasury because such relief redressed its continuing interest in
being free from illegal discharges in the future.8  Central to the
Court’s conclusion was a premise, based in part on Congress’s implicit
determination in creating the civil penalty scheme, that any company
“in violation” of the Act at the time the complaint was filed likely will
repeat such conduct in the future.9  An award of civil penalties there-
fore would redress the harm by deterring continued unlawful conduct.
Thus, in upholding standing, the Court arguably carved out for Con-
gress a greater role in determining redressability than likely was an-
ticipated after its Lujan decision.
Part I of this Article initially examines the role of congressionally
created interests, the violation of which may give rise to standing.  Al-
though the Court has recognized congressional creation of new inter-
ests, the Court in Lujan held that the injuries defined by Congress
3. See 504 U.S. at 576-78.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
7. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
8. See id. at 187-189.
9. See id. at 184-186.
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must be individuated.10  The Court may defer to congressional deter-
mination of the adequacy of particular injuries, but not when the inju-
ries are drawn too broadly.
In addition to injury in fact, the Court requires the relief sought
to redress the injuries asserted.  Otherwise, judicial decisions would
resemble advisory opinions.  The Court has vacillated in deciding how
demanding the redressability inquiry should be.  In City of Los An-
geles v. Lyons11 the Court held that a plaintiff who had suffered inju-
ries as a result of a chokehold administered by Los Angeles City Po-
lice Department officers could not seek an injunction because the
injunction would not help redress any injury in the absence of a
showing that plaintiff likely would be subjected to a chokehold in the
future.12  Similarly, in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment,13 the Court apparently was of the view that parties can only re-
cover penalties payable to the government if they can demonstrate a
substantial continuing risk of harm.  The Court’s decision in Laidlaw,
however, undercuts Lyons and Steel Company by permitting suit even
when the prospect that the relief would prevent future harm is highly
speculative.  The decisions can be accommodated, however, by un-
derstanding the pivotal congressional role in determining that par-
ticular remedies are likely to redress categories of harm.  The Court
was willing to defer to Congress’s determination that there was a sig-
nificant risk of recurring harm in Clean Water Act cases while there
was no congressional judgment to defer to in Lyons and only an insuf-
ficiently considered judgment in Steel Company.
Part II then briefly explores the normative underpinnings of
Laidlaw.  Accepting for the purpose of this Article the Court’s
standing doctrine,14 deference to Congress comports with a proper
understanding of the allocation of authority among the branches.
Congress is better equipped than courts to engage in fact-finding.  It
has the time and resources to assess the remedial issue more fully
than the courts.  Given Congress’s wide latitude in determining which
parties should enforce particular laws, courts should defer to explicit
and implicit congressional findings that illuminate the link between
10. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992).
11. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
12. See id. at 98.
13. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
14. For my own views on the Court’s premise that congressional creation of a right to sue is
not sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement, see Harold J. Krent &
Ethan Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH L. REV. 1793 (1993).
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relief and injury.  Only in the most extreme cases should the Court
second-guess a congressional determination of deterrent impact.  In-
deed, congressional findings as to redressability help make Congress’s
enforcement decisions more transparent and accessible to the public
as a whole.
Part III then considers the limits that courts should place on
Congress’s power to ensure redressability.  First, courts should review
any determination as in Steel Company to convince themselves that
the congressional judgment is at least plausible.  Second, to ensure
that redressability exists in a particular case, courts should allow de-
fendants to show that there is no realistic chance of redressability
given the particular circumstances.  Despite the deference that should
be afforded to congressional determinations in this area, this article
concludes by arguing that courts should not find redressability for
plaintiffs who can only claim a stake in the litigation—whether be-
cause of expectations of a bounty or attorney fee award—unless the
award provides either compensation for past injury or sufficient de-
terrence of repeated wrongdoing to protect plaintiffs from future
harm.
I
The Supreme Court has recognized a wide ambit within which
Congress can determine which interests can be vindicated in court.
Throughout the nation’s first century the Court, often without com-
ment, permitted Congress complete discretion in determining the in-
terests that could be raised in lawsuits.15  In general, restrictive rules
of justiciability only began to emerge as a reaction to activist judges
striking down legislation in the Lochner era.16  The Court never ex-
plicitly articulated an independent requirement of an injury in fact
until the Warren Court, and then perhaps only as a misguided effort
15. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional
Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52 (1985); William
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Louis Jaffee, The Citizen as Liti-
gant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033
(1968); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J.
1141 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 173-78 (1992); Steven Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).  See also Sunstein, supra note
15, at 179-81; Fletcher, supra note 15, at 225.
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to simplify the legal inquiry into whether a particular plaintiff could
sue.17
In demanding injuries in fact, the Court stressed that the injury
must be direct and palpable.  The Court controlled whether the asser-
tion of economic, aesthetic, or environmental harm sufficed.18  If the
injury were too abstract or generalized, the Court denied standing.19
After articulation of the injury in fact test, the Court struggled in
determining whether Congress had plenary authority to recognize or
create injuries that would satisfy the Court’s test.  For instance, in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,20  the Court considered
whether a white tenant could sue under a statute permitting anyone
to challenge housing discrimination practices.21  Congress in essence
had created a new interest that safeguarded the opportunity to bene-
fit from “interracial association.”22  The Court found injury in fact and
permitted the suit to proceed.23  In the absence of the statute, how-
ever, it would have been difficult to recognize the injury as sufficient
to open the courthouse doors.  Indeed, Justice White in concurrence
commented that he “would have great difficulty in concluding” that
standing was satisfied but for the statute.24  Similarly, in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman,25 the Court recognized that housing testers—who
had no interest in renting or purchasing homes—had standing to
challenge the owner’s refusal to sell or lease principally because Con-
gress had conferred on “all ‘persons’ a legal right to truthful informa-
tion about available housing.”26  During this period, Congress created
a wide variety of citizen suits, particularly in environmental contexts.27
17. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 188.
18. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 683-90 (1973); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
54 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
20. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
21. See id. at 206-207.
22. See id. at 210.
23. See id. at 212.
24. See id. (White, J., concurring).
25. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
26. See id. at 377.  See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163-168 (1997) (addressing Con-
gress’s role in creating citizen suits).
27. The Court’s decision in Morton, 405 U.S. 727, provided a blueprint when it denied
standing in an environmental context only because there was no individual injury or stake as-
serted.  See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Clean Water Act of
1976, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Air Pollution Prevention and Control
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The Court’s recognition that Congress can create interests whose
violation gives rise to Article III injury should not be surprising.
Since the inception of the country, Congress has accomplished the
same result by creating property interests.  Pursuant to Congress’s
power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”28 for example, early
Congresses authorized the President to commission private ships to
capture enemy vessels trading with the enemy.  Those armed with the
letters of marque could tow the captured vessel into the United
States’ jurisdiction and then file an in rem action in federal court
seeking a declaration of ownership.29  But for the congressional ac-
tion, private parties could not have asserted any property ownership
in the vessels seized, and could not have established standing.  More
recently, congressional creation of property-type interests (though
not full entitlements) in the electromagnetic spectrum30 and sulfur di-
oxide31 similarly allows permit parties to assert standing that they oth-
erwise would have lacked to contest government action.
Congress plays a critical role in determining which parties should
be permitted to sue for what type of injuries.  Congress helps deter-
mine the parameters of a case or controversy under Article III of the
Constitution.  Members of Congress, like members of the Court, have
an independent obligation to interpret and defend the Constitution.
In Lujan, however, the Court for the first time32 blunted a con-
gressional effort to create a new interest whose violation could give
rise to injury in fact.  Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),33
Congress directed agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to ensure that actions funded by them were “not likely to jeop-
(Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994); Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
29. See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 152-53 (1943).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (authorizing auctions of electromagnetic
spectrum).
31. 42 U.S.C. §7651, §7651o (1994).
32. The Court’s summary affirmation in McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981), aff’g 513
F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981), arguably constitutes an earlier example.  There, the Court upheld
dismissal of a lawsuit challenging then Representative Abner Mikva’s appointment to the
bench.  See 513 F. Supp at 266-67.  The problem was that Mikva as a representative had voted
for a pay increase for all judges in arguable violation of the Emoluments Clause.  See id. at 265.
Despite the fact that Congress authorized any of its members to challenge the appointment, the
Court refused to reach the merits of the claim.  See id. at 271.  Congressional standing poses par-
ticular problems because of Congress’ self-dealing in affording its members the power to help
enforce the laws.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
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ardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threat-
ened species. . . .”34  After the Department of the Interior promul-
gated a regulation limiting the scope of the consultation provision to
actions taken within this country, plaintiff environmental organiza-
tions sued under the citizen-suit provision codified in the ESA,35 as-
serting that the lack of consultation increased the chance that federal
agency funds would support projects abroad that would threaten en-
dangered species.36  For example, they focused on federal support for
rehabilitating the Aswan High Dam, which threatened the habitat of
the endangered Nile crocodile.37
The Court found the individual injury too indirect, and thus fo-
cused on whether the congressional authorization for suit supplied
the requisite interest to create the injury in fact that was otherwise
missing.  The Court concluded that congressional authorization would
not satisfy the standing requirement.  The Court independently scru-
tinized the congressional grant of standing to ensure that the injury
was sufficiently individuated:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest
in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual
right” vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most impor-
tant constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”38
At least in suits against the federal government, Justice Scalia warned
that private lawsuits—in the absence of particularized injuries—im-
peded the Executive’s ability to execute the law faithfully.  Otherwise,
private citizens, and not the Executive, would be enforcing public law.
Through private suits, individuals would decide, at least in part, how
to implement congressional regulatory objectives.  Article II concerns
thus shaped the Court’s analysis of Article III.39
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
36. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-563 (1992).
37. See id. at 563.
38. Id. at 577; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-922 (1997) (elaborating
further Justice Scalia’s views pertaining to congressional direction that state officers—as op-
posed to private parties—execute the laws in investigating applicants for gun ownership: “[T]he
insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive—to ensure both vigor and ac-
countability—is well known.  That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with
him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws”)(citations omitted).
39. The problem may be one not of interfering with the President’s duty to take care to
enforce the laws faithfully, but rather with the President’s status as the sole official charged with
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The Lujan opinion acknowledged that cases or controversies
may be created by statutes creating legal rights, but stated “that in
suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury require-
ment must remain.”40  Justice Kennedy in concurrence presented a
more accommodating position, explaining that Congress “has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”41  But,
he, too, found that the interests under the ESA were too diffuse.42  A
majority of the Court, therefore, may support some deference to
Congress in defining new injuries, but will mandate that the injuries
be individuated.
The Court has invalidated congressional grants of standing out-
side the citizen suit context.  For instance, in Raines v. Byrd,43 the
Court considered Congress’s determination in the Line Item Veto
Act to permit any member of Congress to sue to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the Act.44  Congress may have permitted members of
Congress to sue because their interests as legislators would be
uniquely affected by the exercise of the line item veto.  The Court
concluded, however, that the injury to the plaintiff members of Con-
gress was too indirect and explained that “[i]t is settled that Congress
cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily grant-
ing the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have
standing.”45  No mention of deference was made.
In Lujan and Byrd the Court focused exclusively on injury in
fact.  For the past thirty years, however, the Court has also stressed
that causation and redressability constitute independent requirements
a litigant must meet to satisfy standing under Article III.46  With re-
the responsibility to represent the interest of the nation as a whole.  See Krent & Shenkman,
supra note 14, at 1801-1808.
40. See 504 U.S. at 578.
41. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 579-580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
44. 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
45. See 521 U.S. at 820 n.3.  The Court in Federal Election Commission v. Akins relaxed
some of Lujan’s rigor.  See 524 U.S. 11 (1998).  There, the Court held that a party enjoyed
standing to challenge the agency’s failure to subject a particular lobbying group, AIPAC, to re-
porting and registration requirements. See id. at 11-12.  Even though the informational injury
was shared with many others not participating in the lawsuit, the Court reasoned that the con-
crete nature of the injury—the lack of information—made injury in fact easier to determine.
See id. at 24.  The Akins decision appears to conform to the requirements set forth in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan.
46. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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spect to the redressability hurdle, all plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the relief sought can provide them with some tangible benefit.  For
instance, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.47  an unwed mother sued to force
prosecution of the child’s father for failure to pay child support.  The
Court acknowledged the injury, but concluded that plaintiff lacked
standing because a favorable decision would not necessarily “result in
payment of support.”48  The Linda R.S. decision contemplated that
courts don a forecasting cap to gauge whether any relief might have a
measurable impact on plaintiff.  Redressability constituted an addi-
tional obstacle to surmount for any plaintiff vindicating an interest in
federal court.  Similar analysis led to findings of a lack of redressabil-
ity in Warth v. Seldin49 and in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization.50
If the injury would not be redressed, then a judicial resolution
would resemble an advisory opinion, and would suffer from the same
vices.  Courts would be addressing important questions that they oth-
erwise could avoid, and might thereby become embroiled in political
disputes.  Judicial resources might be squandered, and the respect due
the judiciary as an independent branch of government might be jeop-
ardized.  Moreover, redressability ensures that issues are presented to
the courts “with that clear concreteness provided when a question
emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision. . . .”51  Finally,
the absence of any concrete consequences might lift modest con-
straints upon judges because they are more often free to change the
law if the stakes are lower.52  In other words, it is easier for courts to
issue decisions with little direct consequences—such as a directive in
Lujan to the Department of the Interior to consult more broadly—
than when the results are more palpable.
In addition, the redressability inquiry helps weed out ideological
plaintiffs.  Courts may prevent such plaintiffs, to the extent possible,
47. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
48. See id. at 618.
49. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (finding insufficient evidence that low cost housing would have
been available but for allegedly discriminatory practices of defendants).
50. 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (finding insufficient likelihood that defendants would have provided
more hospital care to indigents even in absence of alleged unlawful regulation).
51. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).  See also Federal Election Commission v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Evan Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 605, 644-45 (1992).
52. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(deciding cases without impact on the parties is “the handmaid of judicial activism”); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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from using courts as a platform from which to pursue political agen-
das.53  Judges should only use resources to resolve disputes when they
have the capacity to provide some tangible relief to an injured plain-
tiff.
Indeed, although the majority in Lujan found that the injury as-
serted was not imminent enough to satisfy the injury in fact require-
ment, a plurality stressed that “[t]he most obvious problem in the pre-
sent case is redressability.”54  Only the Secretary of the Interior would
be bound by any judgment, and even if the federal funding agencies
withdrew support for the projects, “it is entirely conjectural whether
the non-agency activity . . . will be altered.”55  In other words, the As-
wan Dam might well have been rehabilitated irrespective of the U.S.
support, and the habitat for the Nile crocodile threatened.  The link
between any relief awarded and redress for the particular injury—de-
fined as preservation of the Nile crocodile—was too attenuated.
The opinion did not specify whether congressional legislation
could affect the Court’s assessment of redressability.  Indeed, the
concurring opinions would have omitted all discussion of redressabil-
ity in the case.56  Left undecided, therefore, was whether Congress
should have any role in influencing the redressability inquiry.57
The redressability question came to the fore in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.58  There, the
Court considered whether the Clean Water Act permitted citizens to
sue for violations which had ceased by the time suit was filed.59  Under
the citizen-suit scheme, affected individuals—in the absence of state
or federal enforcement—may commence actions against any person
“alleged to be in violation of” federal requirements60 after affording
53. As Professor Stearns notes in this symposium, ideological plaintiffs may try to manipu-
late the Supreme Court’s agenda to ensure a favorable precedent.  See generally Maxwell L.
Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321 (2001).
54. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992).
55. See id. at 571.
56. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. The Court determined that there was redressability in Bennett v. Spear, without in-
quiring into Congress’ role in illuminating the link between asserted injury and relief sought. See
520 U.S. 154, 155 (1997).  There, plaintiff sued under the Endangered Species Act for review of
a Biological Opinion issued by the Fish & Wildlife Service.  See id. at 154. According to the
Court, a favorable opinion would have enhanced the possibility that the federal government
would have continued support for the Klamath Irrigation Project.  See id. at 168-171.
58. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
59. See id. at 56.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
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sixty days notice.61  A citizen may sue either for injunctive relief or to
require payment of civil penalties to the federal government.62
Between 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney violated various regulatory
requirements, discharging an excessive amount of pollutants.  After
affording the statutorily required notice, two nonprofit corporations
filed suit in June 1984 alleging that their members had been harmed
by the pollution and that Gwaltney “has violated . . . [and] will con-
tinue to violate” the Clean Water Act.63  Gwaltney moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that all violations had ended several weeks
prior to suit, and that therefore it could not be said “to be in viola-
tion” of federal requirements.
The Court agreed.  Largely as a matter of statutory construction,
the Court determined that the “to be in violation” language in the
statute required citizen-plaintiffs to “allege a state of either continu-
ous or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood that a
past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.”64  The Court con-
tinued, however, that the language could be satisfied by a “good faith
allegation of continuous or intermittent violation.”65  The Court clari-
fied that, even if the allegations later proved unfounded, jurisdiction
would attach, and plaintiffs could continue seeking civil penalties
payable to the government for the wholly past violations.66
In response, Gwaltney argued that allowing suit to proceed for
wholly past violations would violate Article III because plaintiffs’ in-
jury would not be remediable by the suit.67  Plaintiffs could proceed
only if the relief attainable—either the injunction or penalties—re-
dressed their injury.  If there were no injury at the time the suit was
filed, then there was nothing left to remedy.  The Court was un-
moved.  As long as some chance of recurrence of injury existed, the
Court reasoned that the Article III case or controversy requirement
was honored.68  Article III permits suits to collect civil penalties pay-
able to the U.S. Treasury, presumably because such suits would
61. See id. at § 1365(b)(1)(A).
62. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53.
63. See id. at 54.
64. See id. at 57.
65. See id. at 64.
66. See id. at 64-67.
67. Defendants in Gwaltney also argued, as would defendants in Laidlaw, that the suit be-
came moot given that the offending conduct has stopped and was unlikely to recur. See Gwalt-
ney, 484 U.S. at 50. Both Courts rejected the arguments. See id.; see also Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188-194 (2000).
68. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66.
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minimize the likelihood that such future injury would occur.  The
majority did not elaborate on how likely the deterrent impact must
be.  Nor did it elaborate whether congressional direction could influ-
ence its determination of redressability.  Nonetheless, as long as the
chance of injury continued, then redressability and hence Article III
requirements, could be satisfied.
In concurrence, Justices Scalia, Stevens, and O’Connor disagreed
with the majority’s approach.  In their view, if no violation existed on
the date the suit was filed, then “the plaintiffs would have been suf-
fering no remediable injury in fact that could support suit.”69  A fa-
vorable result—the civil penalties—would not remedy the prior harm
because the penalties were paid to the U.S. Treasury, and there was
no showing that the injury was likely to recur.
The Court’s decision over ten years later in Steel Company v.
Citizens for a Better Environment70 seemingly adopted the concur-
rence’s view in Gwaltney.  There, a citizen group sued for violations
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986 (EPCRA).71  The company had failed to file required inventory
forms in a timely manner.  The EPCRA permitted a private suit to
require “an owner or operator of a facility for failure . . . to complete
or submit an inventory form. . .”72 as long as no agency action was
pending.73  After the plaintiff organization had notified the agency of
the company’s tardiness—as mandated under the EPCRA74—the
company filed the requisite forms before suit was commenced.75
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that no
case or controversy was established due to the lack of redressability.76
No relief could plausibly remedy the injury of late reporting.  In par-
ticular, plaintiff had relied upon the availability of civil penalties, but
the Court held that, because “these penalties—the only damages
authorized by the EPCRA—are payable to the United States Treas-
ury,” the plaintiff “seeks not remediation of its own injury—reim-
bursement for the costs it incurred as a result of late filing—but vindi-
69. See id. at 70.
70. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994).
72. See id.
73. See id. at §11046(e).
74. As under the Clean Water Act, the EPCRA incorporated a notice requirement as a
prerequisite to filing suit.  See id. at § 11046(d).
75. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 87-88.
76. See id. at 106.
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cation of the rule of law.”77  As in Lujan, therefore, plaintiff would be
acting not on its own behalf, but rather as a shadow executive de-
partment in violation of Article II.  Here, the target of the citizen suit
was a private party instead of the government agency as in Lujan.
Nonetheless, private suits can undermine the enforcement levels that
federal agencies deem optimal.  Such suits can either force the gov-
ernment to enter frays that they would prefer to avoid or, if the gov-
ernment does not intervene, result in settlements that the government
might not find to be in the public’s best interests.78
In addition, the Court specifically rejected the possibility that the
civil penalties would redress plaintiff’s injury by “deter[ring] the risk
of future harm.”79  Only if plaintiff had alleged a continuing violation
“or the imminence of a future violation” would there be redressabil-
ity,80 and only then if plaintiff could demonstrate “a likelihood that
the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.”81  Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy concurred, explicitly agreeing with the re-
dressability part of the Court’s opinion.82
Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but vehemently objected
to the redressability analysis.  Labeling the analysis “mechanistic,”83
he explained that
[w]hen one private party is injured by another, the injury can be re-
dressed in at least two ways: by awarding compensatory damages or
by imposing a sanction on the wrongdoer that will minimize the risk
that the harm-causing conduct will be repeated.  Thus, in some
cases a tort is redressed by an award of punitive damages; even
when such damages are payable to the sovereign, they provide a
form of redress for the individual as well.84
According to Justice Stevens, remedies that enhance deterrence of fu-
ture wrongdoing satisfy the redressability prong of Article III, and
77. See id.
78. See Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 167 (2001).
79. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106-07.
80. See id. at 108.  Furthermore, the prospect of recovering investigation and prosecution
costs was insufficient because the litigation must give the plaintiff some other benefit besides
reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct of the litigation itself. See id. at 107 (“[An] interest
in attorney’s fees is . . . insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists
on the merits of the underlying claim.”) (citations omitted).
81. See id. at 110.  Much of the Court’s opinion can be considered dicta, however, because
plaintiff evidently did not satisfy statutory standing because there was no showing that defen-
dant was “in violation” of the Act at the time the suit was filed.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 124.
84. Id. at 127.
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thus he would have permitted plaintiff to seek civil penalties, even
though payable to the United States Treasury.
The picture of redressability in Steel Company therefore appar-
ently contrasts sharply with that in Gwaltney.  In Gwaltney redress-
ability could be demonstrated as long as any possibility of future in-
jury existed coupled with prior injury, while in Steel Company a
different coalition of judges supported the proposition that the likeli-
hood of future injury must be greater, and the injury imminent.
The Court in Laidlaw seemingly flip-flopped again, returning to
Gwaltney’s analysis.  As in Gwaltney, plaintiff environmental organi-
zation filed a citizen suit against a company for violations of pollution
limits prescribed in the Clean Water Act.  Plaintiff sought injunctive
relief and penalties payable to the United States Treasury after de-
fendant had failed to halt the discharges within the sixty-day notice
period.85  Unlike in Gwaltney and Steel Company, Laidlaw was in
violation of the pertinent regulations at the time plaintiff’s suit was
filed.  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Laidlaw had
closed the offending facility, making the likelihood of future injury
extremely low.  An injunction would not have been appropriate, and
collection of civil penalties would not have redressed plaintiff’s past
injuries any more than it would have in Steel Company.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the Friends of the Earth had
standing to seek the monetary penalties.  Although the Court reiter-
ated that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each
form of relief sought,86 it held that private parties could seek penalties
payable to the government in light of the fact that “all civil penalties
have some deterrent effect.”87 The Court continued that “there may
be a point at which the deterrent effect of a claim for civil penalties
becomes so insubstantial or so remote that it cannot support citizen
standing.”88 The Court concluded, however, that the district court had
reasonably determined that the penalties were needed to effectuate
deterrence on the facts of this case: “that the penalties would redress
FOE’s injuries by . . . preventing future ones.”89
The majority attempted to distinguish Steel Company on the
ground that the violations had ceased by the time the suit was filed.
85. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 176-177
(2000).
86. See id. at 185.
87. See id. (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)).
88. See id. at 186.
89. See id. at 187.
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As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, that distinction is meaningless.  Im-
position of civil penalties should deter future violations irrespective of
whether the violations ceased one month before suit was filed or one
month after.  A defendant in both contexts would think twice about
future violations “once hit in its pocketbook.”90  The likelihood of fu-
ture violations may differ in the two contexts, but the deterrent func-
tion of civil penalties payable to the government is identical.91
Irrespective of the date on which the violations ceased, the criti-
cal question for redressability under the Court’s doctrine should be
whether the prospect of future injury was sufficiently high on the day
suit was filed to warrant imposition of the civil penalties.  Civil penal-
ties payable to the government redress not the prior injury,92 but are
designed to minimize the likelihood of future recurrence.  Perhaps,
plaintiff’s failing in Steel Company was that it neglected to allege that
the prospect of future harm—that defendant would again fail to re-
port its discharges—was substantial.
A comparison with the Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons93 is illustrative.  There, plaintiff challenged the city’s practice of
encouraging law enforcement officers to subdue suspects by dint of a
chokehold.  The theory was that, by using chokeholds, police would
not have to rely on weapons.  Use of the chokeholds, however, re-
sulted in several deaths and numerous serious injuries.
Plaintiff had been subjected to a chokehold, and sued to stop the
city from engaging in the practice.  The Court dismissed the suit,
holding that he lacked standing to seek an injunction against contin-
ued use of the chokehold.  Plaintiff could seek damages for injuries he
had suffered, but in the absence of any reason to think that he would
again be subjected to a chokehold, no case or controversy existed.94
If the analysis in Lyons reflects current doctrine, the question in
environmental citizen suits should be whether plaintiffs have demon-
90. See id. at 186.
91. Thus, the Court has come full circle since Gwaltney.  The Court initially determined
that civil penalties payable to the federal government, by deterring future misconduct, satisfied
redressability.  See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987). Then, the Court in Steel Company held that
redressability could not be justified unless the likelihood of future injury was high and the threat
imminent.  See 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).  Finally in Laidlaw, the Court once again determined
that penalties can redress injuries by deterring future misconduct, even when there has been no
concrete demonstration of a likelihood of recurring harm.  See 528 U.S. at 186.
92. As long as the injury conceptualized is that of the plaintiff, as opposed to the public at
large.
93. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
94. See id. at 105-09.
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strated a sufficient risk of future harm to justify the civil penalty
award.  The record in neither Steel Company nor in Laidlaw con-
vincingly demonstrated such risk.
The Court in Laidlaw, however, seemingly deferred to Con-
gress’s decision to create particular remedies in the Clean Water Act.
It stated:
Congress has found that civil penalties in Clean Water Act cases do
more than promote immediate compliance by limiting the defen-
dant’s economic incentive to delay its attainment of permit limits;
they also deter future violations.  This congressional determination
warrants judicial attention and respect.95
Justice Ginsburg further stressed that “[t]he legislative history of the
[Clean Water] Act reveals that Congress wanted the district court to
consider the need for retribution and deterrence, in addition to resti-
tution, when it imposed civil penalties. . . [The district court may] seek
to deter future violations by basing the penalty on its economic im-
pact.”96
The structure of the statute reinforces this understanding.  No
damages are available for past violations.  The two key remedies in-
stead are injunctions or civil penalties payable to the United States,
both designed to deter future violations.  And, neither is available un-
til after defendant is granted a sixty-day time period within which to
change its conduct.  Thus, once a plaintiff can demonstrate that a de-
fendant is in violation of the Act on the date the complaint is filed,
Congress presumptively intended that the other two remedies be
available.
To be sure, Congress did not explicitly make any findings about
redressability under the Clean Water Act.  And, the statutory struc-
ture under the EPCRA similarly permits an inference that Congress
determined that civil penalties would help redress continuing viola-
tions there.
The link between civil penalties and injury under the EPCRA,
however, is not as intuitively compelling for three reasons.  First, the
Court may well have discounted Congress’s role under the EPCRA in
95. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185.
96. Id. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1987)).  Furthermore, one of
the Senate reports accompanying amendments to the Clean Water Act asserted that citizen suits
“have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gains.”  See S. REP. NO. 90-50, at
28 (1985).  Similarly, a Senate Report supporting revisions to the Clean Air Act explained, “the
assessment of civil penalties for violations of the [Clean Air] Act [is] necessary for deterrence,
restitution and retribution.” See S. REP. NO. 101-228, 373 (1989).  See also 136 CONG. REC. 5627
(1990) (remarks of Senator Chafee).
I - LAIDLAW REDRESSING THE LAW OF REDRESSABILITY - KRENT.DOC 04/25/01  9:38 AM
Fall 2001] LAIDLAW:  REDRESSING THE LAW OF REDRESSABILITY 101
determining that civil penalties were necessary to deter companies
from future violations.  Congress apparently adopted the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act remedial scheme wholesale in establishing
the EPCRA (as well as other environmental enforcement schemes).
Congress may not have demonstrated sufficient independent concern
for the efficacy of the remedial scheme in the EPCRA context.  Ac-
cordingly, the Court had less reason to defer in Steel Company.
Second, the framework of the EPCRA suits supports the infer-
ence that Congress did not make any findings as to the need for civil
penalties in that context.  In contrast to most Clean Water Act cases,
there is not likely to be a track record of numerous past violations.
The situation in Laidlaw is not unique.  The district court determined
that Laidlaw had violated the mercury limits on 489 occasions be-
tween 1987 and 1995.97  Environmental groups monitoring discharges
seldom sue after one random violation, but only after a pattern has
been discerned.  After 489 separate violations spanning an eight-year
period, the presumption that such discharges will continue absent a
deterrent is strong.  In comparison, there was only a single violation
alleged in Steel Company.  There was less reason, therefore, to as-
sume that the defendant would continue to violate the Act in the fu-
ture.98
Third, and related, defendants who violate the Clean Water Act
arguably are more culpable than their counterparts under the
EPCRA.  Officials in such companies are well aware of the legal re-
quirements, and well aware of the magnitude of their discharges.
They can monitor effluent levels just as readily as can the Friends of
the Earth and other environmental organizations.  From the prior
conduct, one can presume a continued risk of lawlessness, as indeed
occurred in Laidlaw.  Companies that have knowingly discharged ex-
cessive contaminants are likely to continue illegal discharges in the fu-
ture.  On the other hand, under the EPCRA, companies may violate
the Act inadvertently, either by failing to file in a timely fashion, or
by presenting information that the agency deems misleading.  Viola-
97. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176.
98. The fact patterns of the two cases also differ in that the defendant in Steel Company
cured the defect within the sixty-day period, unlike the defendant in Laidlaw.  See Laidlaw, 528
U.S. at 176; Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 87-88.  When a defendant takes vigorous steps to stop the of-
fending conduct quickly, the presumption of recurring violations has less force.  In sharp con-
trast, the defendant in Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limit thirteen times after suit was
filed, and committed an additional thirteen monitoring and ten reporting violations.  See 528
U.S. at 176.  The Court’s finding of no standing in Steel Company reflected its conviction that
the likelihood of continuing injury after defendant’s voluntary compliance was low.
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tions may stem from negligence as opposed to knowing behavior.
The difference in level of culpability may be critical, for a prior viola-
tion under the EPCRA may not be indicative of future violations.
Thus, in light of the different probabilities of recurring harm, the
Court was more willing to defer to congressional creation of civil
penalties under the Clean Water Act: a presumption of continuing
harm only exists in that context.
In short, Congress under both the Clean Water Act and the
EPCRA determined that civil penalties payable to the government
should be available to private plaintiffs.  But only under the Clean
Water Act did Congress make its reasoning clear, and that context
more fully supports the premise that defendants who have violated
statutory requirements are quite likely to violate them again in the fu-
ture.
Congress could have made the link between past and future inju-
ries under the Clean Water Act more explicit, and any such findings
may well have aided the Court in reaching its redressability analysis.
Familiarity with the dynamics of Clean Water Act suits evidently per-
suaded the Court to defer to the congressional scheme, despite Con-
gress’s lack of detailed findings.  Laidlaw therefore illustrates Con-
gress’s critical role in determining that particular remedies are likely
to redress particular harms.
II
Accordingly, this Part briefly sketches the normative assumption
underlying Laidlaw—courts should defer to congressional determina-
tions that selected remedies will likely deter particular harms.  Such
congressional determinations may be implicitly reflected in the logic
or legislative history of the enforcement scheme, in explicit legislative
findings, or in creation of statutory mechanisms such as nominal
damages or bounties designed to ensure that an individual’s interest
in an action be redressable by a favorable judgment.  In any of the
contexts, Congress’s determination that citizens should be able to sue
for particular remedies warrants deference.
Deferring to legislative findings explicitly or implicitly supporting
the redressability of a particular injury comports with traditional
separation of powers principles for a number of reasons.  First, care-
ful empirical work by legislatures can persuade judges of causal con-
nections that may have seemed a stretch at first glance.  The redress-
ability inquiry turns on the likelihood that a particular remedy will
redress the plaintiff’s injury.  Because of its wide-ranging nature, con-
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gressional fact finding might assess the possibility of remediation bet-
ter than efforts by judges or their clerks.
Even in Lujan, the concurring and dissenting Justices recognized
the special role for Congress in creating interests whose violation can
give rise to a cognizable injury in fact.  In comparison to implicit con-
gressional declarations as to injuries in fact in Lujan or Raines, there
is greater reason to defer to fact finding or determinations as to the
connection between particular remedies and the injuries alleged.
As an initial matter, factual analysis bears on whether the link
between remedy and potential for future violations exists.  Courts
may not have the empirical data to assess whether particular compa-
nies are likely to continue violations after a complaint is filed.  Judg-
ments “on the deterrent effect of the various weapons in the armory
of the law can lay little claim to scientific basis.  Such judgment as yet
is largely a prophecy based on meager and uninterpreted experi-
ence.”99 Moreover, courts may not have experience in gauging
whether the prospect of civil penalties deters effectively.  Some reme-
dies such as injunctions are likely more effective than awards of
nominal damages and perhaps civil penalties as well.  In addition, the
deterrent effects of remedies may differ depending upon the statutory
context, the size of the defendant, and the ease of compliance.  Such
congressional determinations can therefore aid the Court in assessing
whether a particular remedy is likely to redress a potential harm, such
as the harm in Laidlaw of recurring discharge of pollutants in excess
of permissible levels.
Moreover, courts may wish to monitor the injury in fact determi-
nation more than redressability because of their gatekeeper role.
Courts will face fewer conflicts with the coordinate branches if par-
ticular interests—whether interests in effective enforcement of the
law or in environmental health—fall outside those recognized as satis-
fying the injury in fact test.  Once injury in fact is satisfied, the num-
ber of cases avoided by enforcing redressability strictly is not as great.
Thus, courts arguably should be willing to defer to congressional de-
terminations more in the redressability context.
Indeed, factual issues often inform constitutional analysis.  For
instance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez100 adverted to
the advantages of legislative findings in demonstrating a link between
99. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940).
100. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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regulation and the flow of interstate commerce.101  The majority
commented that, “to the extent that congressional findings would en-
able us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in ques-
tion substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking
here.”102  The concurring opinion suggested the result might have
been different had congressional findings illuminated the commercial
character of the regulation prohibiting possession of a firearm near
schools.103  In dormant commerce clause cases as well, the Court has
asked whether legislative findings demonstrate that a challenged state
regulation will bring legitimate safety and health effects.104  Commer-
cial speech regulation may turn on the need to protect consumers
from confusion or misrepresentation.105  As the Supreme Court re-
cently reiterated in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,106
“courts must accord substantial deference to predictive judgments of
Congress.”107
101. See id. at 562.
102. Id. at 563.
103. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  When Congress builds a record, as it has, for
instance, under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994),
the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), the Child Support Re-
covery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), and the Child Restoration and
Penalties Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), the task of reviewing courts is
lightened.  Instead of speculating as to the connections between the regulation and interstate
commerce—as Justice Breyer did in the Lopez dissent—courts rather can rely on the empirical
bases demonstrated in the congressional findings.  Most would agree that Congress has better
factfinding capabilities than do courts.  Thus, directing Congress to build a record can stream-
line—and sharpen—the judicial task of reviewing federal legislation for conformity to the
Commerce Clause.
104. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (inquiring into health
and environmental safety reasons for a waste control ordinance favoring a local business); Kas-
sel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 705-09 (1981) (inquiring into safety reasons
for state rule burdening national trucking companies).
105. See Posados de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 333-34 (1986) (up-
holding regulation of advertising of casino gambling aimed at Puerto Rico citizens in part be-
cause “[w]e have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature’s interest in the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a ‘substantial’ governmental interest”).  See
also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-393 (2000) (deferring to legislative
judgments about level of corruption engendered by certain campaign practices); Colorado Re-
publican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (discussing
usefulness of congressional finding in demonstrating the corruption that supports campaign fi-
nance regulation).  And, in Eleventh Amendment cases, congressional findings may shed light
on whether Congress can authorize individuals to sue states for violations of federal law.  See
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah, 198 F.3d 1201
(10th Cir. 1999).
106. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
107. Id. at 196.
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One might wonder whether courts should defer at all to legisla-
tive findings in constitutional cases.  In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Un-
ion108 the Court held that factual determinations in certain areas of the
law such as under the actual malice standard in libel law must be in-
dependently reviewable on appeal.109  To ensure superintendence over
the constitutional claim, appellate courts can review factual findings
more stringently.  Courts might afford even less deference to fact
finding by political actors.  Under the now discredited constitutional
fact doctrine in administrative law, for instance, courts retained the
discretion to retry all factual determinations made by agencies to pre-
serve full control over the constitutional claims.110  Otherwise, factual
findings could unduly influence the availability of relief under the
Constitution.
But deference to the findings of a coordinate branch of govern-
ment cannot be equated with capitulation.  The Court explained in
Turner Broadcasting that “[w]e owe Congress’ findings deference in
part because the institution is far better equipped than the judiciary
to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legisla-
tive questions.”111
Indeed, the Court this past term in United States v. Morrison112
stressed that “the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient,
by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legisla-
tion.”113  The Court criticized Congress for relying in its findings on
“reasoning” previously rejected by the Court.114 Although courts
should not defer to Congress’s assessment of the legality of its own
legislation, they have deferred to the superior fact finding ability of a
coordinate branch of government including Congress’s “findings
as . . . to the remedial measures adopted. . . .”115  
108. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
109. See id. at 501 n.17.
110. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon,
253 U.S. 287 (1920).
111. 520 U.S. at 195.
112. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
113. See id. at 673-74.
114. See id.  As the dissent pointed out, the findings in Morrison were far more probative
and careful than in many prior cases.  See id. at 682-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  The Court in
the last several terms has accorded less deference to the judgment of the coordinate branch.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
115. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
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For a variety of reasons, the current Court will likely defer more
to explicit than implicit findings.  Some members of the Court have
shied away from attention to congressional intent drawn from com-
mittee reports, hearings, and the like.  Justice Scalia in particular has
noted the unreliability of such materials.  As he explained in Wiscon-
sin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,116
[a]ll we know for sure is that the full Senate adopted the text that
we have before us here, as did the full House, pursuant to the pro-
cedures prescribed by the Constitution . . . we should try to give the
text its fair meaning, whatever various committees might have had
to say—thereby affirming the proposition that we are a Govern-
ment of laws, not of committee reports.117
According meaning to legislative history may sanction lawmaking
outside the constitutionally prescribed procedures of bicameralism
and presentment.  Danger resides on a more practical level in vesting
too much power in committee reports and the like—which may well
have been written by staff members and interest groups.
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s views in this respect have not com-
manded a majority.  The Court has relied on such evidence in consid-
ering a variety of issues, including whether Congress provided a clear
statement of its intent to regulate states or to subject the federal gov-
ernment to suit.118  The more explicit the findings, however, the less
controversial and the greater the deference that likely will be shown.
Part of the rationale for deferring to Congress’s assessment of re-
dressability, therefore, turns on its comparative advantage in fact-
finding.
A second justification rests on concern for a due process of law-
making.  Encouraging the use of legislative findings may promote
greater deliberation as to the wisdom of congressional authorization
for particular individuals to sue.  Congress arguably should exercise
care in determining which parties are appropriate in which contexts to
bring suit.  To be sure, members of Congress may relegate responsi-
bility to craft such findings to staffers.  Few members of Congress
116. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
117. Id. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[c]ommittee reports . . . are frail substitutes for bi-
cameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President”); INS v. Cardozo-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987); cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(considering legislative history in search for clear statement needed to supplant prior consent
decree).
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read reports or summaries of hearings; for that matter, few may read
the intricate text of voluminous bills.  But in some cases, the need to
make findings may itself prompt greater debate as to what kind of
findings to place in the statute.  Indeed, in the exceptional case, leg-
islation may not only be slowed but altered due to the difficulty
members of Congress (or staffers) have in making a convincing nexus
between a particular remedy and the injury suffered.
In this respect, required findings operate like clear statement
rules of statutory construction, which the Court has applied—albeit
not always consistently—when reviewing legislation that trenches
upon Tenth119 and Eleventh Amendment concerns.120  The Court will
not interpret a statute to invade a core state function or subject a state
to suit in federal court in the absence of a clear statement.  A clear
statement approach adds costs to legislation, but at the same time at-
tempts to prompt Congress to deliberate more forthrightly about the
wisdom of such legislation.121  As the Court stated in Gregory v. Ash-
croft,122 the clear statement rule ensures “that the legislature has in
fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters in-
volved.”123
Congress arguably should not open the courthouse doors unless
it has broad-based political support.  It should only permit wide
ranging inquiry into executive branch administration of the laws when
it is on firm terrain.  When the Court is skeptical about the nature of a
plaintiff’s injuries or motives, congressional findings reassure the
Court that Congress has in fact determined that such suits are appro-
priate.  Findings, like clear statement rules, help ensure that congres-
sional action impinging on Article III (or Article II) concerns is a
product of reflection and deliberation.
Third, encouraging a legislative record opens up the legislative
process to greater public scrutiny.  Individuals can better assess the
basis for congressional action.  When the link (or lack thereof) be-
tween fines and continued polluting is better understood, citizens can
119. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
120. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); cf.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1866-67
(2000) (stating that the presumption that the term “person does not include the sovereign” may
“be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary”).
121. See generally John C. Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement
Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771; William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
122. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
123. See id. at 461 (citations omitted).
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hold their representatives more accountable for their actions.  In es-
sence, legislative findings reduce the cost to the public of under-
standing and then monitoring their legislative agents’ actions.
In short, the Court’s deference in Laidlaw to Congress’s decision
to provide civil penalties under the Clean Water Act as a means to
deter future wrongdoing is normatively appealing.  Even though the
structure of the statutory scheme in the EPCRA is similar, the differ-
ent social and economic contexts may have convinced the Court that
there was no reason to presume a high probability of continuing in-
jury.
If Congress, however, would have made findings suggesting that
a single failure to file an accurate report under the EPCRA likely
leads to repeated violations, then the Court would have had to ad-
dress the linkage between remedy and future injury more directly.
Depending upon the strength of the legislative showing, the Court
might have been persuaded to recognize the likelihood of recurring
injury as it did in Laidlaw.  Deference to congressional fact finding
makes sense both as a matter of policy and formal separation of pow-
ers doctrine.
III
Courts, however, should place limits on Congress’s efforts to in-
fluence the redressability inquiry.  Judges should not blindly accept
congressional statements or efforts to legislate away any redressabil-
ity concerns for a number of reasons.  First, given that redressability
remains part of standing, courts should exercise the authority to de-
termine the bounds of the case or controversy requirement rooted in
Article III.  Second, even when Congress has plausibly fashioned a
link between a particular remedy and harm on the wholesale level,
the congressional forecast of the likelihood of continuing injury, or a
congressional assessment of the deterrent effect of a selected remedy,
may fall apart in a given case.  Third, due to separation of powers
concerns, courts maintain an appropriate role in ensuring that Con-
gress follows particular procedures in designing the congressional
mechanisms that assure redressability—Congress must ensure that
redressability is demonstrated apart from a stake in the litigation it-
self.
A. Judicial Review
Under the Supreme Court’s contemporary view, standing doc-
trine constitutes a critical component of the case and controversy re-
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quirement of Article III.  Courts understandably will review congres-
sional efforts to confer standing on individuals to safeguard the values
underlying standing doctrine.  As the Court stated in Raines, “Con-
gress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily
granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have
standing.”124  Absent review, Congress would have plenary authority
to link particular remedies to common law or statutory injuries that
have scant connection.
For instance, assume that Congress authorized all persons to
challenge unlawful conduct by the FBI.  Congress further might de-
clare that individuals, assuming injury in fact, will benefit from a
finding of illegality by receiving assurance that the government is op-
erating within the confines of the law.  Courts presumably would find
such congressional declaration insufficient to demonstrate that a fa-
vorable resolution of the suit would redress the injury.125  Alterna-
tively, Congress may rely on such weak statistical inferences in mak-
ing its connections between injury suffered and remedy selected as to
forfeit any deference.  The remedial scheme under the EPCRA may
represent such a case.  Judicial review protects the core requirements
of a concrete dispute and adverse parties that delimit the bounds of
Article III.
B. Overcoming Congressional Findings in Specific Cases
Moreover, any congressional determination as to the connection
between relief and injury may not hold in the particular circumstances
of a case.  Standing doctrine contemplates that plaintiffs in particular
cases enjoy a sufficient stake in the controversy to invoke the Court’s
authority.  Standing is evaluated at the retail, not the wholesale level.
Thus, although congressional determinations or findings as to re-
dressability as in Laidlaw merit deference, the presumption of re-
dressability should be rebuttable.  Congressional determinations as to
the likelihood of recurring harm or as to the effectiveness of deterrent
measures make sense only in the aggregate.  Congress could not pos-
sibly foresee all of the contexts in which the question of redressability
could arise.  A congressional determination that a particular remedy
124. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997).
125. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (noting that the “right to have the
Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction
on a federal court”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Associate Builders & Con-
tractors v. Hovey Elec., 16 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting efforts by plaintiffs to require the
state to enforce the law).
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redresses a harm in the generality of cases is entitled to respect, but
the individual characteristics should still be considered.126  This is not
to suggest that defendants can overcome a presumption of redress-
ability by arguing that damages or penalties will not successfully deter
them in the future.  When Congress determines that penalties such as
cease and desist orders or injunctions are appropriate, courts should
accept their deterrent effect.  Nor can defendants argue that such re-
lief is unnecessary because they will not violate the law in the fu-
ture.127  But, defendants should be able to point to any extraordinary
reasons arising prior to initiation of the lawsuit—such as technologi-
cal or statutory changes—that make resumption of the wrongful con-
duct highly unlikely.  If there is no realistic chance that defendants’
conduct will again harm plaintiff, then plaintiff has nothing at stake in
seeking deterrent remedies, whether they take the form of an injunc-
tion, damages, or penalties payable to the government.
The same, of course, is true with congressional creation of inju-
ries.  Congress can recognize an interest in environmental quality, but
someone who does not live near the disputed region still cannot sue.
In Trafficante, the Court respected Congress’s determination that a
tester could sue, but a tester who did not actually apply to the par-
ticular housing units could not challenge the housing policies.  Simi-
larly, with respect to redressability, a defendant under the Clean Wa-
ter Act can try to establish, as Laidlaw tried, that it is unlikely to
violate the Act in the future given unique circumstances, despite the
legislation.128  District courts should have the discretion to make the
126. In this respect, the Court’s analysis departs from Professor Fletcher’s recommendation
that redressability be considered only at the “wholesale” level.  See Fletcher, supra note 15, at
242-43.  If the only question were whether Congress has conferred a cause of action, then re-
dressability would only be considered at the greater level of generality.  But, given the Court’s
insistence that litigants in each lawsuit demonstrate a concrete injury and that it be redressable,
the connection between relief sought and the injury suffered must be assessed in particular
cases.  In Lyons, for example, the Court may have held that even Lyons’ injury was redressable
if he could have marshaled empirical evidence demonstrating a greater possibility that he would
be subject to another chokehold.
127. Cf. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (stating that a case is not
mooted when “defendant is free to return to his old ways”)
128. In determining standing, the Court relies on the factual context at the time the suit is
filed.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n.4 (1992) (explaining that standing
is “assessed under the facts existing when the complaint is filed”); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
“[s]ubject matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought”)
(citation omitted); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating
that “standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint”).  Thus, even if the
likelihood of recurring injury becomes either greater or less as the suit progresses, courts will
not take that into account in determining redressability.  Indeed, in Laidlaw, the potential for
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ultimate call as to whether the relief sought will redress injury, but the
determinants—and presumption of redressability—are set by Con-
gress.
C. Limits of Congressional Mechanisms to Assure Redressability
In lieu of findings, Congress at times seeks to ensure redressabil-
ity by altering the legislative scheme so that plaintiffs receive tangible
benefits from pursuing the suit.  Although courts should allow Con-
gress wide latitude in shaping the relief attainable, such relief must
redress an interest apart from the litigation itself.
Payment of monetary damages, irrespective of the form, consti-
tutes the traditional means of redressing injury.  Plaintiffs injured by
torts or breaches of contract can recover damages as one means of
redressing the injury.  If Congress had authorized the plaintiffs in
Laidlaw or Lujan to recover damages (liquidated or otherwise) to
compensate them in part for the environmental and procedural inju-
ries suffered, then the remediation principle would be honored.
There might be a point at which congressional creation of a damages
remedy would fail to redress a particular injury.  Nonetheless, almost
every congressional provision of a damages remedy should satisfy the
redressability requirement.
Congress similarly might try to overcome any redressability ob-
stacles by authorizing punitive or nominal damages awards.  Such
damage awards are not directly linked to the injuries suffered.  Puni-
tive damages punish the offender, and the amount of the award is not
commensurate with restoring plaintiff to its rightful position.129  As the
Supreme Court recently summarized, “[p]unitive damages may prop-
erly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”130  Most would agree
that a recovery of punitive damages satisfies redressability if the
plaintiff has in fact suffered injury.  The recovery might be more than
necessary to redress the injury, but that should not offend any Article
III requirement.  The redressability requirement does not impose any
recurrence was extremely low at the time the Supreme Court considered the case because the
offending plant had been shut down.
129. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (noting that “the practice of awarding damages far in excess
of actual compensation for quantifiable injuries . . . date[s] back to the thirteenth century”);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
130. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
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obligation that the congressional remedy be closely tailored to the
injury suffered, just that there be some redress.131
The Court, however, must ensure that plaintiff has suffered some
cognizable injury that the punitive damages can redress.  If the puni-
tive damages award does not help remedy the harm, then the absence
of redressability would convert plaintiff into a private attorney gen-
eral.
For instance, consider Plotkin and the Better Government Asso-
ciation v. Ryan.132  There, a registered Illinois voter and political
watchdog group alleged that the Secretary of State’s office coerced
employees into making contributions and performing campaign work
during the gubernatorial campaign of former Secretary of State and
now governor George Ryan.133  That coercion allegedly led to two
separate injuries: an official subsidy for the Ryan campaign that un-
dermined the democratic process, and more dangerous roads because
employees were forced to sell drivers’ licenses to cover the cost of the
campaign contributions.134
With respect to the subsidy, however, defendants’ actions
harmed plaintiffs’ interests only as voters, injuries shared with the
general populace.  Under Lujan, such injury cannot satisfy the Article
III injury in fact test.  Nor could standing be predicated on Plotkin’s
separate injury as a user of Illinois’ roads.  The relief sought, includ-
ing punitive damages, would not “redress his injury.”135  The punitive
damages might ensure him financial comfort, but not prevent danger-
ous driving by those who improperly obtained licenses.  And there
was no likelihood that he personally would be injured by any con-
tinuing unlawful conduct, much as in Lyons.  Accordingly, the court
threw out the suit.136
But the punitive damages award, by providing deterrence, might
redress plaintiff’s injuries if a likelihood of future injury existed that
could be deterred.  If Plotkin had been able to show that coercion in
the Secretary of State office was continuing, then the award of puni-
131. Punitive damages on occasion may be justified on the grounds that the injury may be
difficult to quantify monetarily or damages might be undercompensatory, as in wrongful death
cases or instances of crippling injury.  See RICHARD S. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
82-85 (3d ed. 1986).
132. No. 99-C 53, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16214 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
133. See id. at *2-3.
134. See id. at *3.
135. See id. at *15.
136. See id. at *20-21.
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tive damages may have deterred that conduct.  Just like civil penal-
ties, punitive damages would make new harms much less likely.137
Nominal damages present the flipside of punitives because they
provide less than full relief.  An award of nominal damages, as in civil
rights cases, should comparably satisfy the redressability requirement.
Nominal damages can be seen as a way to redress a harm by provid-
ing moral vindication—the award stamps the defendant’s actions as
unjust, and provides a measure of relief for the prior injury.  As the
Supreme Court stated in Carey v. Piphus:138
common-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of
certain ‘absolute’ rights that are not shown to have caused actual
injury through the award of a nominal sum of money.  By making
the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages
without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to
organized society that those rights be [sic] scrupulously observed.139
Property rights have been protected in a similar fashion through tres-
pass suits even when no tangible harm can be demonstrated.  An
award of nominal damages plainly redresses the prior injury.
An award of nominal damages, however, has a less pronounced
impact on deterrence.  A one-dollar fine, by itself, may not change
behavior.  Nonetheless, if the prospect of continuing harm exists, the
damages award of even a nominal amount serves a deterrent purpose.
Defendants may strive to avoid another finding of liability, and the
accompanying financial or social loss.  Congress, therefore, may help
ensure redressability by providing for nominal damage awards as long
as the award redresses prior injury or prevents recurrence of future
injury.
Whether Congress can satisfy redressability through other
mechanisms such as bounties or attorney’s fees poses a more difficult
question.  With respect to attorney’s fees,140 the Supreme Court in
Diamond v. Charles141 found that a party’s interest in attorney’s fees
was insufficient to support standing.  Even though Diamond stood to
lose fees if the case were dismissed, he lacked standing to continue
137. Punitive damages rarely if ever have been authorized or awarded in contexts such as
declaratory judgment actions to deter conduct before the injury occurs, presumably because the
“punishment” is not yet due.  No Article III obstacle, however precludes such use as long as a
sufficient risk of continuing injury exists, as in Laidlaw.  With respect to deterring future harm,
the punitive damages function similarly to an award of civil penalties.
138. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
139. Id. at 266.
140. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986) (holding that an award of attorney’s fees
belongs to a party and not to the attorney).
141. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
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litigating the merits.  Rather, what is required is “an injury with a
nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regulation at is-
sue.”142  A party’s expectation of an attorney’s fee award does not
confer standing or demonstrate redressability because it is not di-
rectly related “to the substantive character of the statute or regulation
at issue.”143  Otherwise, Congress could avoid standing (and advisory
opinion) obstacles merely by dint of affording anyone ten percent
reimbursement of fees for any successful constitutional claim against
the government.  The injury in fact and redressability prongs would
be circumvented.  The expectation of an attorney fee award therefore
does not give rise to standing—at least under current doctrine—if no
other injury exists.
Similarly, in Steel Company the Court held that the expectation
of reimbursement for litigation costs is insufficient to satisfy redress-
ability.144  Even though Congress had created the expectation, only in-
terests related to the substance of the cause of action suffice to create
standing.  As the Court explained, “[t]he litigation must give the
plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a
byproduct of the litigation itself.”145  Reimbursement of litigation ex-
penses would not redress the underlying wrong.
Some have argued that bounties operate quite differently.146  If
Congress provided that successful plaintiffs in citizen suits receive a
cash bounty, the argument goes, then redressability concerns are sat-
isfied.  The bounty might redress the injury in one of two ways: first, it
might compensate for some of the environmental or other loss suf-
fered; and second, it might redress the procedural interest—the
bounty—conferred by Congress on citizens wishing to challenge ad-
ministrative action.
Support for this view stems from historical qui tam practice.  Qui
tam and informer’s actions have proceeded since the nation’s found-
ing.147  There, the injury can be conceptualized either as derivative,
e.g., suing on behalf of the United States, or more individuated in the
sense of efforts to take advantage of the opportunity provided by
142. See id. at 70.
143. See id.
144. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107-108 (1998).
145. Id.
146. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 232.
147. See generally Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J.
341 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).
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Congress to collect funds.  The prospect of a bounty affords a per-
sonal stake in the controversy.  Under either view, the payment of the
bounty redresses the injury.  As even the plurality opinion in Lujan
noted, “[n]or, finally, is [this] the unusual case in which Congress has
created a concrete, private interest in the outcome of a suit against a
private party for the government’s benefit, by providing a cash
bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”148  Several courts recently have
upheld standing in qui tam cases on the ground that the bounty pro-
vides sufficient interest to confer standing.149
Indeed, prior to enactment of citizen-suit provisions in the Clean
Water Act, individuals attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent
violation of environmental laws through qui tam suits.150  Like citizen
suits, qui tam actions provide a means through which citizens can help
enforce the laws even when the executive branch has not taken an ac-
tive enforcement role.
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens151—decided in the
same term as Laidlaw—rejected the bounty theory.  Before conclud-
ing that a private party could not bring a qui tam action against a
state, the Court considered whether the qui tam relator had standing
to pursue the False Claims Act case against Vermont.  Although the
relator, if successful, would have collected a bounty, “the same might
be said of someone who has placed a wager upon the outcome.  An
interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff
standing.”152  A bounty does not alter the nature of the injuries to be
redressed in litigation, but only creates a stake in its outcome, much
like an attorney hoping for a contingency fee or fee shifting award
might enjoy.
A comparison with the letters of marque cases is helpful.  There,
Congress in a sense creates standing, but before any party can invoke
148. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992).
149. See United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs., 985 F.2d 1148, 1154
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Because the qui tam relator (1) funds the prosecution of the FCA suit, (2) will
receive a private share in the government’s recovery only upon prevailing, (3) may be liable for
costs . . . the relator’s personal stake in the case is sufficiently ensured.”); see also United States
ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 618-19 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
150. See Connection Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1972)
(explaining in part that private suits “could well be highly disruptive to permit intervention in
Refuse Act enforcement by a private citizen not charged with general responsibility or over-
sight”).
151. 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
152. Id. at 1862.
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the court’s jurisdiction, that party must first take action by capturing
the foreign ship and towing it back into this country’s territory.  The
private party must obtain the property interest in advance of the law-
suit—the lawsuit by itself does not create the interest that gives rise to
standing.  The cognizable injury must be distinct from the lawsuit.
Viewed another way, the Court does not recognize property in-
terests in litigation as sufficient to support standing.  Otherwise, Con-
gress could delegate the responsibility to enforce laws through litiga-
tion to any concerned individual, irrespective of the individual’s
interest in the litigation.  Although the line between creation of inter-
ests antecedent to the litigation and in the litigation itself may seem
thin, it represents one way for the Court to protect against wide-
spread delegation of the President’s authority to enforce the law.153
Just as injuries in fact must be individuated under Lujan, so too must
remedial mechanisms be linked to specific injuries.  And, courts in
other contexts have held that an interest in avoiding or carrying out
litigation is not sufficient to keep lawsuits alive.154  The individual in-
jury requirement safeguards against congressional displacement of
the President as the chief law enforcement officer.
Bounties, nonetheless, can create sufficient redressability if a
separate injury in fact exists.  In that case, the bounty may serve the
same deterrent function as civil penalties.  If the injury may continue
after the lawsuit, then the bounty deters future wrongdoing.  Like the
civil penalties in Laidlaw, bounties can act as a financial deterrent of
unlawful conduct.
Congress thus has ample discretion to ensure redressability, both
by crafting findings that demonstrate the link between the asserted
injury and the relief sought, and by authorizing remedies such as pu-
nitive damages, civil penalties, and even at times bounties that serve a
deterrent function.  As long as a sufficient chance of future injury ex-
ists, creative remedial schemes satisfy Article III’s mandate of a re-
dressable injury.
CONCLUSION
Laidlaw suggests a new role for Congress in linking remedies to
injuries.  Congress’s policymaking authority plainly includes the
power to authorize individuals who have been injured to sue to pre-
153. See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 14 at 1801-40.
154. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S.
232 (1980) (litigation costs are at times “part of the social burden of living under government”).
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vent recurrence of statutory and constitutional violations that may af-
fect them.  Judges should defer to congressional determinations and
findings that particular injuries will redress particular harms.  Con-
gress has greater ability to assess social, economic, and technological
trends that underlie the inquiry whether injury is likely to recur and
whether a remedy is likely to deter the unlawful conduct.  At the
same time, encouraging such findings facilitates deliberation within
Congress, and the findings enhance the transparency of legislative ac-
tion.  Congress should only open the courthouse doors when the in-
terests raised are clear, and the benefits sought from the lawsuit are
tangible.
Courts, however, continue to discharge a critical function by re-
quiring each plaintiff to demonstrate redressability.  To the extent
that the redressability requirement stems from the case or contro-
versy limitation in Article III, redressability ensures adverseness, lim-
its the role of ideological plaintiffs, and prevents courts from need-
lessly resolving disputes that might embroil them in controversy with
the more politicized branches.  Review of congressional findings of
redressability is needed because the findings may be implausible, or
they might not be probative in the context of the facts of a specific
case.  Moreover, review is also critical to ensure that congressional
mechanisms designed to further access to courts—creation of prop-
erty interests, damage remedies, and bounties—build on interests
separate from those in the lawsuit itself.  Otherwise, Congress can
delegate to private parties an enforcement role at odds with Article
II’s mandate of presidential control over law enforcement.
Nonetheless, with limited exceptions, Congress properly enjoys
wide latitude in determining which remedies are appropriate to vindi-
cate which interests.  By restoring Congress to its appropriate role,
Laidlaw redresses the Court’s law of redressability.
